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ADMINISTRATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PREEMPTION-FORT
WORTH COURT OF APPEALS HOLDS THAT RATE AND ROUTE RE-
STRICTIONS IN THE BOND ORDINANCE BETWEEN FORT WORTH AND
DALLAS IS PREEMPTED BY THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT-Leg-
end Airlines, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, 23 S.W.3d 83 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 2000, No Pet. H.).
T HE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT ("ADA") expressly
prohibits a state or a state's political subdivision from en-
forcing a law or regulation "related to a price, route, or service
of an air carrier."1 Interpretation of this statutory language
played a prominent role in the 1992 case of Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., in which the Supreme Court held that the
ADA preempted advertising guidelines regarding airline fares
because "the obligations imposed by the guidelines would have
a significant impact upon the airlines' ability to market their
product, and hence a significant impact upon the fares they
charge."2 Recently, in American Airlines v. Wolens, the Court ex-
tended the reach of the ADA preemption to state regulation of
air carriers, but did not extend the preemption to state law ac-
tions based on breaches of private contracts.3 Both of these
holdings interpret the preemption provision of the ADA broadly
without analyzing whether advertising guidelines or frequent
flyer provisions are within the scope of the preemption provi-
sion. But since neither of these two cases involved a questiona-
ble preemption situation that would affect airline fares or routes
in a tenuous or remote manner (such as a private contract ac-
tion between municipalities that was entered into before the
federal preemptive provision took effect), the Court was reluc-
tant to express its opinion about where an appropriate line
should be drawn in state actions concerning the scope of the
preemption provision of the ADA.4
Consequently, relying on this same incomplete analysis, the
Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the ADA preempted the
1 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (1994).
2 504 U.S. 374, 390 (1992).
3513 U.S. 219, 222 (1995).
4 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 390.
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City of Dallas from restricting flights out of Love Field.5 But in
reaching its conclusion, the court failed to address the critical
issue concerning the scope of the ADA preemption provision:
whether Congress intended to interfere with existing private
contractual obligations, such as the provisions contained in the
1968 Regional Airport Concurrent Bond Ordinance ("Bond Or-
dinance") between the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth.
In 1964, the Civil Aeronautics Board issued an order recom-
mending that Dallas and Fort Worth consolidate commercial air
passenger service out of one airport.6 As a result of this order,
the two cities entered into an agreement that created the Dallas-
Fort Worth International Airport ("DFW") and made each city a
co-owner.7 The cities also authorized bond issuances to finance
the construction of DFW.s Under the Bond Ordinance, cities
were to "take such steps as may be necessary, appropriate, and
legally permissible ... to provide for the orderly, efficient and
effective phase-out at Love Field ... of any and all Certificated
Air Carrier Services, and to transfer such activities to [DFW] .'-9
But one exception to this consolidation resulted from a Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals decision, 10 which held "Dallas could
not force Southwest to vacate Love Field as long as Love Field
remained open, because Southwest was not a federally certifi-
cated air carrier and [Southwest] was flying only intrastate
routes."11 As a result of this decision and the Bond Ordinance
provisions, each of the major air carriers (except for Southwest
Airlines) agreed to provide air services exclusively at DFW. 12
The passage of the ADA in 1979, which prohibits states from
enacting or enforcing any law or regulation "related to a price,
route, or service of an air carrier,"' 3 was the first step taken by
Congress in its plan to federally deregulate the airline industry,
thus resulting in the consolidation of airline operations at DFW.
The federal preemption provision was intended to preserve
See Legend Airlines, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, 23 S.W.3d 83, 92 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 2000, no pet. h.).
6 See id. at 86.
7 See id.
8 See id. at 87.
9 Id. (quoting the Bond Ordinance).
'o Southwest Airlines Co. v. Tex. Int'l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 103 (5th Cir.
1977).
1 Legend, 23 S.W.3d at 87.
12 See id.
13 See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994).
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"maximum reliance on competitive market forces" 14 by ensuring
that the states would not undo federal deregulation with state
regulation of their own.15 As a result of this legislation, "South-
west applied for and obtained federal certification to begin in-
terstate [flights]."16 Moreover, Southwest's success in obtaining
federal authority to offer interstate service out of Love Field led
to the passage of the Wright Amendment, which prohibited the
Civil Aeronautics Board and the Department of Transportation
("DOT") from certificating interstate flights out of Love Field,
except for commuter airlines with less than fifty-six passengers
or carriers that do not offer ticketing or service beyond Texas
and the four-state perimeter consisting of Louisiana, Arkansas,
Oklahoma, and New Mexico.1 7
The effect of the Wright Amendment was apparent when As-
traea Aviation Services, Inc. wanted to provide air service out of
Dallas, but the DOT concluded "such service would be contrary
to the Congressional goals underlying the Wright Amend-
ment."18 In addition, the opinion concluded that "whether
long-haul service should be allowed at Love Field 'is a question
that needs to be resolved by Congress."'"9 While Astraea's ap-
peal was pending, Congress passed the Shelby Amendment,
which increased service to Love Field by expanding the com-
muter airline exception to include larger aircraft and adding
three additional states to the Love Field service area-Kansas,
Alabama, and Mississippi.2" As a result of the expanded service
area and the enactment of the Shelby Amendment, Legend Air-
lines, a start-up, planned to offer new interstate service from
Love Field.2
In October of 1997, Fort Worth filed the initial lawsuit against
the City of Dallas and Legend Airlines in reaction to its pro-
14 Morales, 504 U.S. at 378.
15 See id.
16 Legend, 23 S.W.3d at 87.
17 See id. at 87-88; see also Southwest Airlines Co. v. Tex. Int'l Airlines, Inc., 396
F. Supp. 678, 686 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (court order permanently enjoining Dallas,
Fort Worth, American Airlines, and the DFW Airport Board from litigating the
validity and enforceability of the Bond Ordinance as it relates to Southwest's
right to the continued use of Love Field), affd, 546 F.2d 84.
18 Legend, 23 S.W.3d at 89.
19 Id.
20 DOT Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-66, § 337(a) - (b), 111
Stat. 1425 (1997); see also International Air Transportation Competition Act of
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-192, §§ 29(a) (2), (c), 94 Stat. 35 [The Wright Amendment].
21 See infra Appendix for a chronology of events that culminated in the current
litigation.
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posed start-up, and asked the trial court to declare that Dallas
was contractually bound by the Bond Ordinance to limit flights
from Love Field to the four contiguous states bordering Texas:
Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico.22 Dallas and
Legend Airlines defended this suit and also filed a separate law-
suit in federal court in November 1997, arguing that federal law
preempted their obligations under the Bond Ordinance. 2 Fur-
thermore, Dallas's federal lawsuit was consolidated with a similar
suit filed by Continental Airlines, resulting in them being added
as a defendant in Fort Worth's suit.24 The DFW Airport Board
filed a cross-claim against Continental asserting that the DFW
private contractual agreements barred signatory airlines from
offering interstate air service out of Love Field.25
In August 1998, at the request of Dallas, Fort Worth, Legend,
and several members of Congress, the DOT started its own pro-
ceeding.26 However, in October of 1998, the state trial court de-
nied Dallas and Legend's motions to defer to the primary
jurisdiction of the DOT and held that: 1) the Bond Ordinance
was valid and enforceable, and it was not preempted by federal
law; 2) neither the ADA nor the Wright or Shelby Amendments
allowed interstate passenger service from Love Field to points
beyond Texas and the four-state perimeter; and 3) Dallas was
obliged under the Bond Ordinance to prohibit interstate pas-
senger service beyond this area.27 As a result of the trial court's
decision, both Dallas and Legend Airlines appealed to the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals.28
In December 1998, however, the DOT concluded that: 1) Dal-
las's commitments under the Bond Ordinance do not restrict
services at Love Field that are authorized by federal law; 2) Dal-
las's ability to limit the type of airline service operated at Love
Field is preempted by both the Wright and Shelby Amendments;
and 3) the "commuter airlines exception" allows any airline op-
erating certain aircraft to make long-haul flights to or from Love
Field.29 Consequently, the City of Fort Worth and American Air-
22 See Legend, 23 S.W.3d at 89.
23 See id.
24 See id. at 89-90.
25 See id. at 90.
26 See id.
27 See id; see also Love Field Serv. Interp. Proc., DOT Decl. Order No. 98-12-27,
58 (1998).
28 See Legend, 23 S.W.3d at 90.
29 See id.
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lines appealed the DOT's order to the Fifth Circuit, which af-
firmed the order.3 °
"The underlying rationale of the preemption doctrine . . . is
that the Supremacy Clause [of the United States Constitution]
invalidates state [and local] laws that 'interfere with or are con-
trary to, the laws of congress." 3' The preemption provision of
the ADA provides a good example of this rationale and illus-
trates Congress's desire to define explicitly the extent to which
federal enactments preempt state law.12 However, in analyzing
an airline preemption issue, the court of appeals's analysis was
incomplete because its conclusion was based solely on the statu-
tory language of the ADA, which states Congress's intent to ex-
plicitly preempt route restrictions.33  The court's analysis
overlooked the possibility that the ADA preemption provision
was not meant to interfere with private contractual agreements,
such as a Bond Ordinance.
Defining the scope of a preemption provision is critical in
properly analyzing preemption questions. 4 Although the Su-
preme Court in previous airline deregulation cases has had to
determine the specific meaning of certain statutory phrases of
the ADA,35 the Court has never considered whether Congress
intended for the ADA to extend to private contractual agree-
ments.3 6 Some lower courts have considered this issue and con-
cluded that private contract actions involving breach of
contract 37 and negligence 3' are outside the scope of the ADApreemption provision and are viable claims.
30 See id.; American Airlines, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 813 (5th
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, __ U.S. - (2000).
31 Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317
(1981) (internal citation omitted).
32 See Legend, 23 S.W.3d at 93; see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 897
F.2d 773, 778 (5th Cir. 1990).
33 See Legend, 23 S.W.3d at 92.
34 See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 232 (holding that the ADA was not meant to resolve
private contract claims in federal court relating to airline rates, routes, and re-
strictions); see also Duncan v. N.W. Airlines, Inc., 208 F.3d 1112, 1114-15 (9th Cir.
2000) (concluding that smoking on flights was not preempted under the ADA
since it did not constitute or relate to a "service" as it is defined in the ADA).
35 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 375 (concluding that the "relating to" language
found in the preemption provision of the ADA meant having "a connection with
or reference to airline rates, routes, or services").
36 But cf. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 232-233 (concluding that private contractual
agreements between the airlines and passengers are outside the scope of the
ADA preemption provision).
37 See id. at 232.
38 See Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d 274, 283 (Tex. 1996).
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Not all lower courts have reached this conclusion. When con-
fronted with an airline preemption question, some lower courts
(such as the Fort Worth Court of Appeals) have applied tradi-
tional preemption analysis, which allows avoidance of the ADA
preemption doctrine only if the restrictions fall within an air-
port owner's proprietary rights and powers, and that the restric-
tions are "limited to [a] reasonable, non-arbitrary, and
nondiscriminatory" advancement of a local interest.3 9 However,
the Fort Worth Court of Appeals dismissed this claim by con-
cluding that the enforcement of the Love Field restrictions for
competitive reasons was neither a reasonable nor a non-arbitrary
advancement of a local interest.40 Alternatively, the ADA pre-
emption doctrine could be avoided if the state action affecting
airline routes was "'too tenuous, remote, or peripheral [in]
manner' to have preemptive effect. 4
1
Writing for the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, Chief Justice
John Cayce stated that without persuasive reasons, such as a
mandate from Congress, state laws and regulations should not
be preempted by federal statute.42 Thus, "[p] reemption ques-
tions require an examination of congressional intent, whether
express or implied. '43 In addition, the examination of intent
requires an analysis of the scope of the preemption provision to
determine whether a state law in conflict with a federal statute is
preempted. 44  Hence, the court of appeals had to decide
whether the Bond Ordinance, which was organized between pri-
vate parties under the laws of a particular state, was more analo-
gous to a private contractual arrangement or to a regulation
under state law.
In analyzing the language of the ADA, Congress expressly pre-
empted state regulation of air carriers "related to a price, route,
39 Nat'l Helicopter Corp. of Am. v. City of New York, 137 F.3d 81, 88-89 (2nd
Cir. 1998); see 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(3) (1994); see also American Airlines, 202
F.3d at 810 (holding that the DOT's order was reasonable in preventing airport
owners from exercising their proprietary rights and powers to restrict services at
Love Field).
40 See Legend, 23 S.W.3d at 95 (the court also stated that even if the restrictions
were reasonable, under Supreme Court mandate, they "must give 'controlling
weight' to reasonable DOT interpretations of the ADA.").
41 Morales, 504 U.S. at 390 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,
100 n.21 (1983)).




or service of an air carrier. '4" As a result, the court of appeals
held that the Bond Ordinance was more similar to a state regu-
lation and was thus preempted by the ADA46 because it put re-
strictions on interstate service routes that airlines could provide
out of Love Field, and it also required the transfer of all inter-
state flights from Love Field to DFW.4 7
Moreover, in determining that the ADA preempted the Bond
Ordinance, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals focused on the
preemption language of the ADA that prohibited a political sub-
division of a state from enforcing a law or regulation related to a
"route,"48 rather than the nature of the Bond Ordinance, which
was a private agreement between the cities and the airlines that
respectively served them. As evidence of a private agreement, all
of the airlines49 signed a voluntary agreement to provide exclu-
sive services out of DFW in accordance with the terms of the
Bond Ordinance in exchange for benefits.
By holding that the provisions of the Bond Ordinance are
preempted by the ADA, the court of appeals is in effect giving its
blessing to the cities and the airlines, who signed exclusive ar-
rangements with each other, to breach obligations that each
promised to honor. And by giving each city the power to void
existing contractual obligations, the purpose and objectives of
Congress in passing the ADA are undermined.
Justice Dauphinot's dissent focused on two significant issues.
First, she argued that despite the DOT's order and the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision to uphold that order, "Dallas is contractually obli-
gated [under the Bond Ordinance] to prohibit scheduled
interstate passenger service to or from Love Field to points be-
yond the four contiguous states [states other than Louisiana, Ar-
kansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico]. ''5° Specifically, section
9.5(A) of the Bond Ordinance requires Dallas to close Love
Field to all Certificated Air Carrier Services (defined as aircraft
operations that provide interstate services on a regular basis by
commercial air carriers according to published flight sched-
45 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994).
46 See Legend, 23 S.W.3d at 92.
47 See id.; see also W. Air Line, Inc. v. Port Auth., 658 F. Supp. 952, 955 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), affd, 817 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom Delta Air Lines, Inc.
v. Port Auth., 485 U.S. 1006 (1998).
48 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994).
49 But see Southwest Airlines, 546 F.2d at103 (declaring that Southwest Airlines
has a right to the continued use and access to Love Field, so long as Love Field
remains open).
50 Legend, 23 S.W.3d at 118 (Dauphinot, J., dissenting).
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ules), unless the flights are necessary in the interest of public
safety or necessary for prudent and efficient operations at the
Regional Airport.5' "The purpose of [this provision was] to en-
sure adequate revenues from operations at DFW to cover the
operating expenses of DFW and to repay the DFW revenue
bonds. '5 2 By concluding that the ADA preempts this provision
of the Bond Ordinance, the majority opinion potentially caused
severe public policy consequences because there is now a
greater possibility of a revenue shortfall without the strict com-
pliance of the airlines with the provisions of their agreement.
Thus, Justice Dauphinot concluded that public policy would be
better served if federal law did not preempt Dallas's obligation
under the Bond Ordinance.
Justice Dauphinot also argued that preemption of an existing
private contractual agreement violated due process. 3 Because
both Dallas and Fort Worth entered into the Bond Ordinance
before the ADA was passed, application of the ADA to the Bond
Ordinance would result in a retroactive application of a stat-
ute, 4 thus violating the cities' due process rights in two ways. 5
First, Fort Worth detrimentally relied on the Bond Ordinance
when it decided to demolish the Greater Southwest Interna-
tional Airport.56 Second, the Bond Ordinance required both
Dallas and Fort Worth to repay the revenue bonds out of the
revenues earned by DFW.5 7 Consequently, a loss of revenue at
DFW Airport due to increased interstate flights from Love Field
affected the ability of both Dallas and Fort Worth to repay the
revenue bonds.58 Because the primary purpose of the ADA was
to maximize competition among the airlines, it is unlikely that
the ADA will be held to have violated the cities' due process
rights.
51 See id. at 118-119 (under the terms of the Bond Ordinance, the cities, each
with respect to its own airport, agree to take such actions as shall be necessary,
appropriate, and legally permissible to provide for the efficient phase-out of all
Certificated Air Carrier Services at Love Field).
52 Legend, 23 S.W.3d at 120-21 (Dauphinot, J., dissenting).
53 Due process is a novel issue that has never been addressed by any court. See
Legend, 23 S.W.3d at 120-21; see also Wolens, 513 U.S. 219; Morales, 504 U.S. 374.
54 The Supreme Court has held that in order for retroactive legislation to sur-
vive a due process challenge, it must be shown that the legislation is justified by a
rational legislative purpose. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co.,
467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984).
55 See Legend, 23 S.W.3d at 120 (Dauphinot, J., dissenting).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 120-21.
58 Id. at 121.
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In conclusion, the ADA was designed to promote "maximum
reliance on competitive market forces. '59 Extending the ADA
preemption provision to private contract matters will cause un-
certainty and an unnecessary restriction on the freedom to con-
tract. Cities and airlines that sign written contracts must be
made to honor their obligations. Based on previous decisions,
the scope of the ADA has only been considered in light of the
"rate, route, or service" language, but not in the nature of mu-
nicipal contractual relationships. But by analyzing ADA pre-
emption issues under a broader framework that considers the
nature of the relationship between the parties, states will have
more freedom to contract and regulate air commerce. Because
the court of appeals did not consider the nature of the existing
contract between the cities, congressional objectives for the reg-
ulation of airlines have been undermined, and important pre-
emption questions remain unresolved.
Randolph j Buchanan*
59 Morales, 504 U.S. at 378.
* Bachelor of Business Administration, Accounting, The University of Texas at
Austin, 1996; Master of Professional Accounting, Taxation, The University of
Texas at Austin, 1996; Juris Doctor Candidate, Southern Methodist University
School of Law, 2002. I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to Professors










Congress passes the Shelby Amendment. It expands
direct flights from Love Field to Kansas, Alabama and
Mississippi and clarifies that airplanes reconfigured with
56 seats or fewer can offer long-haul service.
After Legend Airlines, Inc. and Continental Airlines Inc.
prepare to launch long-haul flights, the city of Fort
Worth and American Airlines Inc. sue those airlines and
the city of Dallas, which owns Love Field, in state district
court in Fort Worth.
The Fort Worth district court sides with the city of Fort
Worth and American Airlines. Legend Airlines appeals
the ruling.
The U.S. Department of Transportation rules that
reconfigured planes can be used for long-haul flights at
Love Field. Fort Worth and American Airlines subse-
quently sue the Department of Transportation in the
Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans.
The Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decides in favor
of Legend Airlines and the Department of Transporta-
tion.
Fort Worth and the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport Board
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
April 2000: Legend Airlines launches its long-haul flights from Love
Field.
May 2000: American Airlines revives long-haul flights from Love
Field and joins the U.S. Supreme Court appeal. The
Fort Worth Court of Appeals reverses the earlier ruling
by the state district court in Fort Worth, citing the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeal's decision.
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APPENDIX
SOME KEY EVENTS IN THE EVOLUTION OF LOVE FIELD
AND ONE OF ITS PRIMARY CARRIERS, LEGEND AIRLINES:
1968: Dallas and Fort Worth establish a bond agreement to
build Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport. In it,
both pledge to promote the optimum development of
D/FW Airport.
1979: Congress passes the Wright Amendment to the Interna-
tional Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979.
When carrying more than 56 passengers, direct commer-
cial flights from Love Field are limited to destinations






The U.S. Supreme Court denies certiorari petitions filed
by the City of Fort Worth, the Dallas/Fort Worth Air-
port Board, and American Airlines asking the high court
to review the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
For the third month in a row, Legend Airlines carries
more people on average aboard each of its flights at
Dallas Love Field than rival American Airlines.
Legend Airlines announces it has lost $4 million more
of revenue in the third quarter than it did in the second
quarter because of climbing jet fuel costs and increases
in other expenses, officials said. Although there was an
82 percent jump in revenue, the Dallas airline suffered a
net loss of $14.8 million from July to the end of Septem-
ber. Previously, the airline had lost $10.8 million during
the second quarter.
Legend Airlines announced that it has suspended opera-
tions pending while searching for additional sources of
funds.






ELEVENTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT REGULATIONS PROHIBITING THE
SALE OF RELIGIOUS LITERATURE AT MIAMI INTERNATIONAL AIR-
PORT ARE CONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THEY ARE REASONABLE IN
LIGHT OF THE PRvIARY PURPOSE OF THE FACILITY - Iskcon Miami,
Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 147 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 1998).
IN THE 1992 CASE Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee,' the Supreme Court held that a New York Port Authority
ban on solicitation of religious materials in airport terminals was
constitutional because the prohibition was reasonable in light of
an airport's primary purpose.2 But the Court found the Port
Authority's ban on distribution of religious materials in airport
terminals to be unconstitutional because it was an unreasonable
restriction on free speech.' The Court distinguished between
distribution (which refers to the handing out of materials), so-
licitation (which refers to asking for contributions), and sale
(which refers to seeking payment for a product or service, like
charging money for literature). While a majority of the Court
clearly decided the solicitation and distribution issues, no major-
ity of the Court directly addressed a ban on the sale of litera-
ture,4 thus leaving the lower courts without clear guidance when
confronted with the selling of religious materials in airport ter-
minals.5 In ISKCON Miami, Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, the Flor-
ida appeals court correctly determined that the same factors
considered by the Supreme Court regarding solicitation of relig-
ious materials in a public forum should also be applied when
ruling on the sale of such literature at Miami International Air-
port ("MIA").6 The Florida court attached the same concerns
that the Supreme Court associated with solicitation-disruption
and intrusion-to their analysis of the sale of literature at MIA
1 See 505 U.S. 672 (1992), 505 U.S. 830 (1992). The several opinions compris-
ing the Court's rulings in the two Lee cases are reported separately in the reporter
series. Discussion of the opinions is commonly consolidated, and the opinions
are referred to collectively as "Lee,"
2 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 684.
3 See id. at 831.
4 See id. at 672.
5 See ISKCON Miami, Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 147 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir.
1998).
6 See id. at 1287.
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and ruled that a Dade County Code regulation prohibiting the
sale of religious materials at MIA did not violate the constitu-
tional rights of International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. ("ISKCON").7
In June 1995, Dade County altered its laws concerning solici-
tation of literature at MIA.' The new regulation provided: "No
person shall solicit alms or contributions of money ... for relig-
ious, charitable, or other purpose, and receive money or other
articles of value, whether in the form of cash, checks, credit or
debit vouchers ... in the public areas of the Terminal." Fur-
thermore, the regulation gave the Director of MIA ("Director")
authority to "prescribe . . . restrictions applicable to First
Amendment activities at the Airport"10 and that these restric-
tions "shall be reasonable . . . and made only after a finding...
that the restrictions are necessary to avoid injury... or to assure
the safe and orderly use of the Airport facilities by the public."
11
The plaintiff, ISKCON, is composed of followers of the
Krishna faith. Because of a strong belief in the power of their
scriptures, ISKCON members must distribute their literature
and solicit support for the religion in public areas.12 ISKCON
has been doing this at MIA since 1974.13
Soon after the laws were changed, ISKCON filed this action in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida claiming that the regulations "unconstitutionally pro-
hibit solicitation of funds" for their religion "and the sale of re-
ligious literature throughout MIA.' 1 4 ISKCON also argued that,
by restricting the areas where ISKCON can distribute their liter-
ature, the Director had "unreasonably restricted [the group's]
ability to engage in the free distribution of literature and other
First Amendment activities."' 5
The parties cross-moved for summary judgment and the court
ruled in favor of the County. Upon appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
7 See id. at 1287, 1291.
8 See id. at 1284.
9 Id. at 1285 (quoting METROPOLITAN DADE CouNTY, FLA., CODE ch. 25, § 25-
2.2(a) (1995)).
10 Id. (quoting §25-2.2(c)).
11 Id. (quoting §25-2.2(d)).





upheld the regulations against ISKCON's First Amendment
challenge.16
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, rul-
ing that the regulations were reasonable restrictions and the
regulation granting discretion to the Director to choose specific
areas for distribution was not unconstitutional. 17 Relying prima-
rily on the Supreme Court decisions and opinions in Lee,18 the
Eleventh Circuit ruled that the same problems that justified a
governmental ban on solicitation in airport terminals in Lee also
rendered a like restriction on the sale of Krishna literature at
MIA reasonable.19
The court found solicitation to be similar to sale because both
entail action by those being solicited.20 In both instances, the
solicitee must stop and decide whether or not to contribute. 21 If
the individual decides to contribute, that person has to grab his
wallet or checkbook and make payment, all of which take up
time and space in busy airport terminals. Following the Su-
preme Court in Lee and United States v. Kokinda,22 the Eleventh
Circuit determined that solicitation
"disrupts passage and is more intrusive .. .than an encounter
with a person giving out information. One need not ponder the
contents of a leaflet or pamphlet in order mechanically to take it
out of someone's hand, but one must listen, comprehend, decide
and act in order to respond to solicitation. 23
The court clarified what it felt was a major contrast between so-
licitation and sales: "Common sense differences between litera-
ture distribution, on the one hand, and solicitation and sales, on
the other, suggest that the latter activities present greater crowd
control problems than the former. '24 Also, the court consid-
ered the stress associated with facing solicitors and the potential
for fraud or coercion by solicitors as legitimate factors for up-
holding the regulations. "The ban on solicitation and sale of
literature ... was implemented to address ... instances of abu-
16 See id. at 1282, 1285.
17 See 147 F.3d at 1282, 1287.
18 See Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 505 U.S. 830.
19 See ISKCON Miami, 147 F.3d at 1287.
20 See id.
21 See id.
22 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
23 ISKCON Miami,147 F.3d at 1287 (quoting Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 734).
24 Id. at 1287 (citing Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640 (1981)).
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sive conduct and misrepresentation on the part of ISKCON
members engaged in solicitation and the sale of literature. 2
The court drew from Lee for support: "[F] ace-to-face solicitation
presents risks of duress that are an appropriate target of regula-
tion. ' 26 The Eleventh Circuit found further backing in the Su-
preme Court's ruling in United States v. Kokinda,27 that "this
description of the problems associated with the sale of literature
in a busily traversed airport rings of 'common sense,' which is
sufficient ... to uphold a regulation under reasonableness re-
view. ' '28 Therefore, the court determined that due to crowd
control concerns in a busy airport terminal, "the prohibition on
solicitation and sale of literature at MIA is a reasonable restric-
tion on speech. 29
To determine what constituted a reasonable restriction, the
court focused on the nature and purpose of MIA." Getting pas-
sengers to-and-from the airplanes is the primary purpose of the
airport. MIA was not built to be a forum for the practice of First
Amendment rights. The court ruled that MIA grounds, includ-
ing the parking lot and sidewalks, "are intended by the County
to be used for air travel-related purposes, 'not to facilitate the
daily commerce and life of the neighborhood or city.' ,,31 There-
fore, the court decided "it is certainly reasonable . . . to con-
clude that solicitation and sales of literature would be
inconsistent with the particularly hectic nature of the airport...
at MIA."'32 This reasoning was synonymous with the Supreme
Court's finding in Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., where it was
determined that "it cannot fairly be said that an airport terminal
has as a principal purpose of promoting the free exchange of
ideas. To the contrary... the purpose of the terminals is... the
facilitation of passenger air travel, not the promotion of expres-
sion. 1 3 Applying the primary purpose test for determining rea-
sonability of First Amendment restrictions is an established
25 ISKCON Miami, 147 F.3d at 1288.
26 Lee, 505 U.S. at 689-90.
27 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
28 Id. at 734.
29 ISKCON Miami, 147 F.3d at 1288.
31 See id. at 1289.
31 Id. (quoting Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 728). In Kokinda, the Supreme Court up-
held a Postal Service regulation that banned solicitation anywhere on postal
property including the post office buildings and the nonpublic sidewalks sur-
rounding the post offices.
32 ISKCON Miami, 147 F.3d at 1289-90.
33 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
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practice by the courts, 4 providing them with solid backing for
decisions regarding this controversial area of free speech.
By wisely choosing to base its ruling on simple and legitimate
concerns for the passengers, the court put itself in a position to
rebuke each of ISKCON's arguments easily. For instance, ISK-
CON tried to distance itself from Lee by claiming that the Lee
Court was mostly concerned with congestion in the terminal,
whereas Dade County's reasoning for the prohibition was driven
by worries about fraud. The court countered by pointing out
that Lee rested on more than merely the problems of conges-
tion. Among the factors cited in Lee for the ban was "the coer-
cive aspects of face-to-face solicitation that make regulation
appropriate. 13 6 The court cited Chief Justice Rhenquist's dia-
tribe in Lee regarding unscrupulous solicitors preying on naive
passengers to show that there was more to their upholding of
the MIA ban than congestion worries: "[T] he unsavory solicitor
can also commit fraud through concealment of his affiliation or
through deliberate efforts to shortchange those who agree to
purchase .... The targets of such activity frequently are on tight
schedules . . . mak[ing] such visitors unlikely to stop and for-
mally complain to airport authorities. '3 7
ISKCON also tried to discredit the ban by arguing that a
straight-out prohibition was unreasonable because any problems
surrounding the sale of literature at MIA can be handled
through regulation. Here, the court pointed out that, as a
non-public forum where travel is the ultimate goal, restrictions
on non-travel activities like sale of literature do not deserve con-
sideration of less restrictive alternatives. "[A] restriction on
speech in a non-public forum will be upheld as long as it is rea-
sonable."39 "[I]t need not be the most reasonable or the only
reasonable limitation."40
34 See Gen. Media Communs., Inc. v. Cohen, 131 F.3d 273, 284-285 (2d Cir.
1997) (upholding constitutionality of congressional act prohibiting the sale of
sexually explicit materials at military exchanges), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 951 (1998);
United States v. Gilbert, 920 F.2d 878, 886 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding injunction
prohibiting personal protest inside courthouse and in adjoining portico
constitutional).
35 See ISKCON Miami, 147 F.3d at 1288-90.
36 Id. at 1288.
37 Id. at 1288-89 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 684).
31 See id. at 1289.
39 Id.
40 Id. (quoting Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730).
20011 CASENOTE 857
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AN COMMERCE
ISKCON also tried to put space between this matter and Lee
by correctly showing that the Lee ban was only for the terminal,
while the MIA ban extended to the parking lot and sidewalks.4'
Once again, the court rebutted this argument by putting the
well being of the passengers first.42 Although the court acknowl-
edged that the availability of nearby spaces is a factor when con-
sidering reasonableness of free speech prohibitions,43 it argued
that other factors, mainly the comfort and safety of passengers,
were more compelling than creating space for sales of literature.
The court took into consideration the affidavit of an MIA em-
ployee to prove that their concerns for passenger safety were
well founded: "It is certainly reasonable for the County to con-
clude that solicitation and sales of literature would be inconsis-
tent with the particularly hectic nature of the airport sidewalks
at MIA."'44 The court thus concluded, "the sidewalks are ...
extremely congested areas where passengers check their bag-
gage ... skycaps wheel carts full of luggage ... and taxis, vans
and private vehicles drop off and pick up passengers .... [E]ven
a brief delay of persons in these areas can lead to extreme con-
gestion and danger of an accident."45
Curiously, ISKCON did not pursue a content-based argument.
ISKCON could have alleged that the County was cleverly hiding
its distaste for the Krishna religion behind a veil of frivolous
safety concerns. In other words, they could have argued that the
Director's restrictions were influenced by the religious content
of the literature for sale, rather than any concern for over-
crowded facilities. The Supreme Court pulls no punches when
it comes to content-based prohibitions: In a non-public forum,
restrictions on speech are permissible so long as they are "not an
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials op-
pose the speaker's view."46 Would the director place like restric-
tions on Girl Scouts or Leukemia Society members selling goods
to raise funds for their respective causes? Because ISKCON did
41 See ISKCON Miami, 147 F.3d at 1289.
42 See id.
43 See Gilbert, 920 F.2d at 886 (noting that "the availability of alternative chan-
nels of communication" is a factor bearing on the reasonableness of a free speech
prohibition).
44 ISKCON Miami, 147 F.3d at 1289-90.
45 Id. at 1289(quoting Affidavit of Winona (Kickie) K. Davis, R-1-19-Exh. 1
14).
46 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
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not broach this issue, the County never had to respond to the
question.
However, even had ISKCON raised a compelling content-
based argument, the County would have likely found solace in
its application of the reasonableness test within the context of
the intended purpose of MIA.47 By ruling that "It]he reasona-
bleness of the Government's restriction of access to a non-public
forum must be assessed in the light of the purpose of the forum
and all the surrounding circumstances," the Supreme Court
provided clear backing for the prohibitions.48
The Eleventh Circuit in ISKCON Miami took a prudent ap-
proach to handling a sensitive matter despite skewed guidance
from the Supreme Court.49 The Lee Court's ambiguous opinion
regarding the sale of literature in airports50 will undoubtedly
trouble courts in the future, especially when it comes to restric-
tions on sales or solicitation of religious literature in airport ter-
minals. If confronted with such First Amendment claims, courts
would be wise to follow the lead of the Eleventh Circuit by apply-
ing a simple reasonableness test based on the persons and pur-
pose of the location involved. When dealing with the most
complex and explosive issues, such as ISKCON's First Amend-
ment claims, the simplest approach has proven to be the best.
Richard Deutsch
47 See ISKCON Miami, 147 F.3d at 1286.
48 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 809
(1985).
49 See ISKCON Miami, 147 F.3d at 1286; Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 505 U.S. 830.
50 See Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 505 U.S. 830.
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Wellons v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.-Defining "Service" Under the
Airline Deregulation Act: Why the Majority of Circuits Are
Wrong.
T HE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT of 1978 ("ADA") in-
cludes a preemption provision that prevents states from im-
plementing any "law, regulation, or other provision having the
force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air
carrier."1 Congress, unfortunately, did not define "service. '"2
Consequently, the courts have been inundated with state law
claims against air carriers and have been forced to interpret the
preemption language of the ADA.' Recently, in Wellons v. North-
west Airlines, Inc.,' the Sixth Circuit was faced with the unenvi-
able task of defining and then interpreting the term "service"
under the ADA. Courts are usually reticent in interpreting stat-
utes when given as little guidance as Congress has provided for
the ADA and the term "service." Despite this reticence, the
Sixth Circuit held that racial discrimination claims based on a
state statute5 and other common law claims, including inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and misrepresenta-
tion, were not preempted by the ADA "[b]ecause the plaintiff's
claims bear only the most tenuous relation to airline rates,
routes, or services."6 In circumscribing the issue to "racial" state
law claims rather than state law claims in general, 7 the Sixth Cir-
1 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
2 See 49 U.S.C. App. § 1301 (11) (1988) (recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 40102
(2000)).
s More specifically, the courts have been cornered into defining "service"
under the ADA. See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378
(1992) (The Supreme Court recognized that "[d]ual economic regulation by fed-
eral and state agencies has produced a conflict"); Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d
254 (4th Cir. 1998); West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 995 F.2d 148, 151 (9th Cir.
1994) (state law tort claims are too tenuous to airline regulation); Somes v.
United Airlines, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 78, 84 (D. Mass. 1999) (discussing whether
the ADA preempted state law tort claims).
4 165 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 1999).
5 The racial discrimination claim was based on Michigan's Elliot-Larsen Civil
Rights Act. See id. at 494.
6 Id.
7 The court was also wrong in basing its decision primarily on what three other
circuits have done rather than basing its decision on sound reasoning. "Unwill-
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cuit misinterpreted Congress's intent and deviated from Su-
preme Court precedent.
In 1993, Brenda Wellons ("Wellons"), an African-American
woman, resigned from her job as a reservation agent for North-
west Airlines ("Northwest") after five years of service.8 Wellons
resigned because she had been involved in a serious automobile
accident and needed long-term therapy; Northwest denied her
requested medical leave of absence. 9 Wellons averred that
Northwest management assured her that when her therapy was
complete, she could reapply and would be rehired. In reliance
on management's promise to her, Wellons reapplied for her old
job after completing six months of therapy. Her application was
refused. She was informed that Northwest had a policy against
rehiring any employee who had been separated from Northwest
for less than one year.10 Wellons alleged that she was never in-
formed of Northwest's "rehiring" policy for former employees,
that a former white female reservation agent in a similar posi-
tion was rehired by Northwest within one year,11 and that she
was still qualified for her old job as a reservation agent.' 2
On September 9, 1996, Wellons brought a three-count com-
plaint against Northwest claiming state law intentional infliction
of emotional distress, state law fraud and misrepresentation, and
racial discrimination in violation of Michigan's Elliot-Larson
Civil Rights Act." Northwest removed the case to federal dis-
trict court and moved for summary disposition.' 4 The district
court granted the 12(b) (6) motion and rejected Wellons's mo-
tion for reconsideration. 15 In February 1997, Wellons appealed
the district court decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.1 6 The Sixth Circuit reversed.1 7
The procedural issue before the Sixth Circuit was whether the
district court was correct in dismissing Wellons's state law tort
ing to create a circuit split as far as race is concerned, we hold that Ms. Wellons'
state law race discrimination claims are not preempted." Id. at 496.
8 Id. at 496-97.
9 Id. at 497.
10 Wellons, 165 F.3d at 497.
11 Id.
12 See id.
13 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2202 (West 2000).
14 Wellons v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 941 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
15 See Wellons, 165 F.3d at 497.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 493.
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claims."' But the Sixth Circuit chose to construe this critical is-
sue narrowly. Judge Nelson, writing for the majority, ruled only
that the ADA does not preempt common law tort claims based
on racial bias,19 and thus dodged the tougher issue of whether
Congress's intent was for the ADA to federalize aviation liability
by preempting all tort claims predicated on state law.2°
Regardless of whether one applies the narrow issue that the
majority framed or the broader issue the Sixth Circuit should
have addressed, Wellons's claim should still be preempted. The
ADA preempts all common law tort claims related to a price,
route, or service of an air carrier.21 Working within the parame-
ters of this preemption mandate, Wellons's claim was properly
dismissed because "all employment-related activities undertaken
by a regulated airline are 'related to' its provision of 'services' to
its patrons. "22
In this case, the dissent (rather than the majority) correctly
framed the issue and determined the conclusions of law.23 The
majority is too concerned with splicing the definition of "ser-
vice" and using its clairvoyant ability to deduce if Congress "in-
tended" preemption for employment discrimination cases based
on race.2 4 The majority missed the proverbial forest by its focus
on the trees. In dealing with federal preemption of state law,
the Supreme Court has held that the "ultimate touchstone" is
whether Congress intended, via legislation, to exclusively feder-
alize the regulation of a particular subject matter.25 Obviously,
in enacting the ADA, Congress chose to forestall state regulation
of the commercial airline industry in favor of exclusive federal
control. It is not the court's place to circumscribe and erode
this preemption because it "cannot believe" Congress intended
"this" or "that."
In a brief majority opinion, Judge David A. Nelson began his
preemption analysis by pointing out the presumption that fed-
eral laws are not intended to replace state laws,26 and that pre-
18 Id. at 494.
19 Id.
20 The dissent deemed this issue to be critical, however. See id. at 497 (Krupan-
sky, J., dissenting).
21 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (1) (2000).
22 Wellons, 165 F.3d at 496 (Krupansky, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
23 See generally 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2000).
24 See Wellons, 165 F.3d at 495.
25 See id. at 497 (Krupansky, J., dissenting) (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987) concerning federal preemption of ERISA).
26 See Wellons, 165 F.3d at 493.
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emption is inappropriate without clear and unambiguous intent
by Congress.27 The remainder of the opinion sought more to
explain away existing precedent than to offer any theoretical ba-
sis for the decision. 8 Judge Nelson noted and then summarily
dismissed Supreme Court precedent on the preemption issue as
"inapplicable" because of disparate factual contexts.2 9 Judge
Nelson reconciled Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 30 and the
court's decision in the instant case by pointing to the dissimilari-
ties in facts between the two cases. In Morales, the Supreme
Court held that the ADA preempts any state attempt to regulate
airfare advertising under state deceptive advertising law. 1
Therefore, Judge Nelson reasoned that Morales and Wellons were
distinguishable because Morales dealt with advertising and Wel-
lons dealt with racial discrimination. The majority used the
same reasoning to reconcile American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens,3 2
which addressed state consumer fraud acts under the ADA, and
the instant case.
Judge Nelson next distinguished the present case from two
state court cases that Northwest relied upon. First, in Belgard v.
United Airlines,3 a Colorado court of appeals held that a class
action brought under a Colorado statute banning discrimina-
tion based on a perceived handicap was preempted by the ADA,
because the suit had a "connection with" the airline's services. 4
Second, in Fitzpatrick v. Simmons Airlines, Inc.,35 a Michigan ap-
pellate court dismissed a case by a baggage handler whose em-
ployment had been terminated based on his inability to meet
the mandatory height and weight rules because it was pre-
empted under the ADA. The Michigan court held that a "law
that restricts an airline's selection of employees, based upon
their physical characteristics, must necessarily have connection
with and reference to, and therefore must be one 'relating to'
27 Id.
28 See id. at 495-96.
29 Id. at 495 (the court states that "[t]he United States Supreme Court has
made it clear that ... the 'related to' language does not vitiate the normal pre-
sumption against preemption").
- 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
31 See Wellons, 165 F.3d at 495.
32 513 U.S. 219, 223-24 (1995).
33 857 P.2d 467 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1117 (1994).
34 Wellons, 165 F.3d at 495 (discussing Belgard, 857 P.2d at 470-471).
35 555 N.W.2d 479 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
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[airline services] ."36 The Sixth Circuit did not disagree with the
holdings in the above cases, but rather distinguished Belgard and
Fitzpatrick because they dealt with physical discrimination, which
might have some bearing on individual's ability to render safe
"service."
Judge Nelson saw no relationship between racial discrimina-
tion and "service" under the ADA.37  Therefore, because
"neither air safety nor market efficiency is appreciably hindered
by the operation of state laws against racial discrimination,"
"[a]n employee's race, as opposed to his eyesight or physical
size, has no arguable connection to safety. '38 Ostensibly, Judge
Nelson's argument, that racial discrimination in any context is
wrong, makes sense. But the issue is whether Congress intended
to federalize the remedy for racial discrimination within the avi-
ation industry, and not whether racial discrimination is wrong
per se.
In his conclusion, after a brief and superficial discussion,
Judge Nelson stated that he is "[u]nwilling to create a circuit
split as far as race is concerned" 39 and then reversed and re-
manded the case. In such an important constitutional matter it
is unfortunate that the majority based its short opinion largely
on its unwillingness to split from the three previous circuits that,
correctly or incorrectly, previously adjudicated the issue.
With the enactment of the ADA, "Congress has unequivocally
evidenced an intent to forestall all state regulation of commer-
cial airlines in any and all particulars related to their prices,
routes, and services, in favor of exclusive federal regulation."40
The majority missed the point by separating alleged discrimina-
tion based on physical conditions41 (such as handicaps) and
non-physical conditions (such as race or gender). The issue is
not how tangentially related alleged racial discrimination is to
the term "services" under the ADA, but rather whether Congress
intended to federalize employment issues for air carriers. Since
employees inherently create airline "service" to customers, any
issue relating to airline employees (hiring, firing, reprimanding,
training) is preempted by the ADA and, therefore, must be re-
36 Wellons, 165 F.3d at 495 (quoting Fitzpatrick, 555 N.W.2d at 481) (internal
citations omitted).
37 Id. at 495.
- See id. at 496.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 504 (Krupansky, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
41 See id. at 496.
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solved exclusively by federal law. It is not the court's place to
second-guess Congress's intent in preempting state law.
Commercial aviation is a complex business 42 that leaves no
part of the nation (or the world) untouched. Therefore, it is
not surprising that Congress felt it prudent to create a uniform
set of laws for the commercial aviation industry. The ADA cre-
ates "efficiency, innovation, and low consumer prices" because it
"prevent[s] states from eviscerating federal deregulation by sub-
stituting state regulation. '43
According to Supreme Court precedent, a recovery of dam-
ages based on a state tort claim is commensurate with state regu-
lation. 4  In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garman, the
Supreme Court held that "regulation can be as effectively ex-
erted through an award of damages as through some form of
preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be,
indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct
and controlling policy."45 The majority has frustrated congres-
sional intent in promulgating the ADA by allowing a broad
range of state tort claims.46
Although this preemption seems harsh, it is important to note
that just because state law is preempted, a potential plaintiff is
not left without an avenue for redress. The majority would have
air carrier "victims" believe that the ADA excludes them from
asserting their First Amendment right to petition the courts.47
Rather, plaintiffs must use federal law to assert their rights. In
the instant case, the only reason Wellons was forced to seek re-
lief under state law was because the statute of limitations had
42 The airline industry has exploded since 1978, much to the credit of the
ADA, employing over one million people and annually providing air transporta-
tion to over five hundred million passengers. MathewJ. Kelly, Comment, Federal
Preemption By the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978: How Do State Tort Claims Fare?, 49
CATH. U. L. REv. 873, 873 (2000).
43 Wellons, 165 F.3d at 500 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
44 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garman, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
45 Id. at 247.
46 "[A] State . .. may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision
having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air
carrier that may provide air transportation under this subpart." 9 U.S.C.
§ 41713(b) (1) (2000) (emphasis added). See Morales, 504 U.S. at 383 (regarding
the "related to" clause, Congress "expressed a broad pre-emptive purpose").
47 "The right to petition is the capstone right of the First Amendment, but...
it is seldom discussed or invoked in constitutional jurisprudence." Raymond Ku,
Antitrust Immunity, The First Amendment and Settlements: Defining the Boundaries of
the Right To Petition, 33 IND. L. REv. 385, 389 (2000).
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run on the analogous federal statutes.48 So the only burden the
ADA creates is requiring a heightened awareness of federal
pleading rules for plaintiffs attorneys when dealing with avia-
tion issues.
Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress legislates and the
courts interpret. In enacting the ADA, Congress unambiguously
intended to "federalize" commercial aviation in the United
States. Aviation is a "national" means of transportation that re-
quires unified regulations to both keep airfares low (which
helps the "national" economy) and keep U.S. air carriers com-
petitive internationally. With the Wellons decision, the Sixth Cir-
cuit, by ignoring Supreme Court guidance,49 has effectively
allowed state regulation by allowing state tort claims °5 0 and thus,
has frustrated Congress's clear intent in promulgating the
ADA-to create a uniform set of regulations so that the "na-
tional" aviation industry can thrive.
Joshua Iacuone
48 The plaintiff was granted leave to amend her complaint so she could plead
federal civil rights claims; however, they were barred by the statute of limitations.
See Wellons, 165 F.3d at 494 n.1.
49 See id. at 497 (Krupansky, J., dissenting) (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at
45 as stating that in the context of federal preemption of ERISA, courts should
look at the totality of the subject in deciding if federal law preempts an issue).




WHAT Is AN "ACCIDENT" IN THE INTERNATIONAL AIR? THE FIRST
CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT AN "ACCIDENT" HAS A FLEXIBLE APPLICA-
TION AND REQUIRES ASSESSMENT OF CIRCUMSTANCES THROUGH
DISCOVERY. Langadinos v. American Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68 (1st
Cir. 2000).
A RTICLE 17 of the Warsaw Convention states that an inter-
national air carrier shall be liable for damages sustained if
the accident took place on board the aircraft.' Although the
Warsaw Convention does not define "accident," the Supreme
Court, in Air France v. Saks, ruled that "liability under Article 17
[of the Warsaw Convention] arises only if a passenger's injury is
caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is
external to the passenger. ' 2 The courts have since struggled
over the definition and the scope of the word "accident."3 In
Langadinos v. American Airlines, Inc.,4 the First Circuit analyzed
the Supreme Court's definition of "accident," interpreting it to
require a flexible application and assessment of the circum-
stances through discovery. In light of this holding, Langadinos's
claim that American Airlines violated Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention by continuing to serve alcohol to an intoxicated pas-
senger who then assaulted Langadinos should survive a motion
to dismiss.5
On June 13, 1996 Langadinos was on an American Airlines
flight headed from Boston to Paris.6 When Langadinos asked a
flight attendant for aspirin, she ignored him and continued
"spoon-feeding ice cream into the mouth of passenger Christo-
pher Debord."7 Debord stared at Langadinos "in a conspicuous
and strange fashion" and then "whispered something into the
flight attendant's ear."8
Later in the flight Langadinos went to use the lavatory.
Debord grabbed Langadinos's testicles, "causing 'excruciating
1 Warsaw Convention, Art. 17, 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (2000).
2 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
3 See Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 2000).
4 Langadinos v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2000).
5 See id. at 69.
6 See id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 70.
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pain.'"9 Debord then proceeded to pull Langadinos's hand to
his own groin. 0 Langadinos notified the flight crew about the
assault. The attendant involved in the spoon-feeding to Debord
dismissed the accusation, while another crewmember said they
would have Debord arrested in Paris.' No action was taken
against Debord in Paris. 12
Langadinos filed a compliant against American Airlines in the
District of Massachusetts alleging common law tort and a breach
of the Warsaw Convention.1 3 The complaint was later amended
to allege that American knew Debord was intoxicated and con-
tinued to serve him alcohol. 14 American did not answer the
complaint, but filed a motion to dismiss under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 12 (b) (6). " The district court granted Ameri-
can's motion and dismissed the complaint.16 Langadinos ap-
pealed the district court's dismissal of the amended complaint
alleging a violation of the Warsaw Convention. 7
The First Circuit had to decide whether the Warsaw Conven-
tion allows a plaintiff to recover when the airline continues to
knowingly serve alcohol to an intoxicated passenger and that
passenger allegedly assaults another.18 The First Circuit re-
versed the district court's granting of the 12(b) (6) motion and
found that Langadinos's claim survived the definition of acci-
dent under the Warsaw Convention.1 9 Using the Supreme
Court's definition in Saks, the court found that "accident" could
encompass recovery for torts committed by fellow passengers.2
Generally, "accidents" have been found only where airline per-
sonnel play a proximate role to the tort action. In Potter v. Delta
Air Lines, the Fifth Circuit did not find an "accident" where an
injury resulted from a passenger dispute over a seat, and no air-
line personnel were involved.2 In addition, the court in Stone v.
9 Id.










20 Id. at 70-71.
21 98 F.3d 881, 883-84 (5th Cir. 1996).
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Continental Airlines held that one passenger punching another
does not constitute an "accident.
22
In arriving at the scope of the word "accident," the Supreme
Court in Saks looked to the practices of other countries. They
found that other countries interpreted the word "accident"
broadly, using a flexible application. 23 The court here, follow-
ing the flexible application of the term "accident," found the
claim to allege enough airline involvement to survive a motion
to dismiss. Langadinos alleged that Debord came across as "in-
toxicated, aggressive and erratic,"24 American knew about this
behavior, and despite their knowledge of Debord's state, they
continued to serve him alcohol. The court, citing Saks, said that
because there was a chain of events that lead to the "accident,"
Langadinos must prove that he did suffer an injury and that
American's serving Debord alcohol lead to that injury.25
The court did not say whether American was responsible for
the alleged assault. Saks requires that the definition of accident
should be flexibly applied only "after assessment of all the circum-
stances surrounding a passenger's injuries. ' 26 The court said this
determination cannot be made until discovery has been
completed.2 v
The court dismissed American's argument that Langadinos's
complaint addressed only emotional injuries.28 Langadinos al-
leged he suffered a physical injury, namely "'excruciating pain'
in the groin area;" the court found this is enough to survive a
motion to dismiss.2 ° American argued that the pleading is de-
fective because Langadinos pled his complaint too generally to
include American's over-serving of alcohol; therefore it should
not be credited in a review." The court agreed with American
that without the claim of over-serving, Langadinos would not
have a Warsaw Convention accident claim because there would
be no connection between American and the alleged assault."
The rudeness of the crew prior to and after the accident does
not create a causal connection between American and the as-
22 905 F. Supp. 823 (D. Haw. 1995).
23 Saks, 470 U.S. at 404-05.
24 Langadinos, 199 F.3d at 71.
25 Id.
26 Id. (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 405).
27 Langadinos, 199 F.3d at 71.
28 See id.
29 Id. at n.3.
30 Id. at 72.
31 Id.
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sault; over-serving is the only link. The court pointed to the
amended complaint, which alleged that before the assault Amer-
ican served Mr. Debord liquor even though he had "aggressive
and erratic behavior" and that American continued to serve him
even though they knew he was intoxicated.32 The court held
this complaint was not defectively pled because it alleged a con-
nection with American and the assault by over-serving. Ameri-
can further argued the phrases "erratic" and "aggressive" did
not adequately describe Mr. Debord's behavior, and requested
Langadinos to provide more detail in the amended complaint.33
The court disagreed with American and noted that Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure only require a "short and plain state-
ment of the claim."34 The court did not require more than the
rules do.
American also argued the complaint should be dismissed
since it alleged "willful" misconduct on the part of American. 5
The court held that under the Warsaw Convention the com-
plainant could seek damages above the $75,000 cap. Langadi-
nos will have to prove American engaged in "willful" misconduct
in order to remove the $75,000 cap. 6 The court further held
American's objection was misplaced since an argument of willful
misconduct goes only to damages.
The First Circuit ruled that Langadinos's alleged assault could
be a proximate result of American Airlines knowingly serving
alcohol to an intoxicated passenger. The Supreme Court has
said that the definition of liability under Article 17 should be
"flexibly applied" after all of the passenger's injuries have been
taken into account.38 The First Circuit was correct in vacating
the motion to dismiss following the Saks reasoning. Langadi-
nos's injuries had not been assessed, therefore the motion to
dismiss should not have been granted. In addition, a reasonable
trier-of-fact could have found a causal connection between the
over-serving of alcohol and the alleged assault.
The court did not decide whether a passenger could recover
for mental injuries in conjunction with physical injuries.3 9 The
32 Id.
33 Langadinos, 199 F.3d at 72.
34 Id. (referring to FED. R. Civ. P. 8).
35 Langadinos, 199 F.3d at 71.
36 Id.
37 See id.
38 Saks, 470 U.S. at 405.
39 Langadinos, 199 F.3d at 71.
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court refused to explore the issue of recovery for mental injures,
although the Supreme Court has ruled an air carrier is not lia-
ble where there are no physical injuries as a result of an acci-
dent.40 The issue of mental injuries was not before the First
Circuit. Langadinos alleged he suffered physical injuries, and
the court found this met the Article 17 requirement that physi-
cal injuries must be suffered in order to bring a Warsaw claim.
The First Circuit did not consider how the Saks Court ana-
lyzed the definition of the word "accident. '41 The Supreme
Court in Saks said that it is the "cause" of the injury, which must
satisfy the definition, rather than just the occurrence of the in-
jury alone.42 Even though the court did not address this aspect
of the definition of "accident," Langadinos's claim satisfied Saks
by alleging that American had a causal connection to the assault
by over-serving an intoxicated man. Instead, the court ade-
quately analyzed precedent43 and looked at how other circuits
resolved similar claims44 to arrive at the conclusion that an acci-
dent will include recovery for torts committed by other passen-
gers if the cause of the injury involved airline personnel.4
The controversy among the judges in Wallace v. Korean Ai 6
shows the trouble a court can have in determining whether a
claim based on a Warsaw Convention Article 17 violation is
valid. The Wallace court struggled with how closely tied the al-
leged accident has to be to the actual operation of an aircraft
and whether the accident involves a risk "characteristic of air
travel. ' 47 The First Circuit did not struggle in interpreting Saks.
The Saks Court gave approval to a lower court case, Oliver v.
Scandinavian Airlines Sys., where a drunken passenger who was
continually served alcohol fell and injured a fellow passenger. 48
The First Circuit relied on this case to arrive at the conclusion
that Langadinos's claim survived the flexible application of "ac-
cident" set forth in Saks. Langadinos's claim stemmed from the
same type of chain of events: Debord appeared intoxicated,
40 See E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991).
41 See Saks, 470 U.S. at 405.
42 Id at 399 ("The drafters of the Warsaw Convention ... specified that air
carriers would be liable if the accident caused the passenger's injury.").
43 See Langadinos, 199 F.3d at 70 (analyzing Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985)).
44 See Langadinos, 199 F.3d at 71 (quoting Potter, 98 F.3d at 883-84).
45 Langadinos, 199 F.3d at 71.
46 214 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 2000).
47 See id. at 300.
48 See Saks, 470 U.S. at 405 (quoting Oliver v. Scandinavian Airlines Sys., 17
CCH Av. Cas. 18, 283 (D. Md. 1983)).
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American knew about it, and American continued to serve him
alcohol.
Although the First Circuit had only to decide whether the
complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted, in
doing so, the court analyzed the law for an Article 17 Warsaw
Convention violation.49 The court interpreted the Saks "acci-
dent" definition correctly to "flexibly apply" to the circum-
stances, once an assessment of the circumstances is made, and
to require airline personnel involvement in the tort.50 The con-
clusion that an accident claim under the Warsaw Convention
requires flexible application and assessment of the circum-
stances follows the reasoning of the precedent under Article 17.
Lorin Runnels
49 Saks, 470 U.S. at 405.
50 Langadinos, 199 F.3d at 70-71 (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 405; Potter, 98 F.3d
at, 883-884).
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Garvey v. National Transportation Safety Board: THE FAA GETS ITS
CAKE AND EATS IT Too
T HE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT provides for a "split enforce-
ment regime" of aviation rules and regulations.' Congress
delegated rule-making and enforcement duties to the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), but assigned adjudicatory au-
thority to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).2
Consequently, an airman who is "adversely affected" by an FAA
order may "appeal the order to the National Transportation
Safety Board."' The viability of that appeal, however, has been
substantially emasculated by the D.C. Circuit Court's opinion in
Garvey v. National Transportation Safety Board.4 Citing the plain
language of the Federal Aviation Act, the Garvey court pro-
claimed that the NTSB is "bound by all validly adopted interpre-
tations of laws and regulations the Administrator carries out...
unless the Board finds an interpretation is arbitrary, capricious,
or otherwise not according to law." 5 As a result of employing
this high standard, the court undermined an airman' s ability to
obtain fair appellate review of FAA enforcement actions as well
as the fundamental objective of aviation regulations generally:
safety in our skies.6
On June 19, 1994, Captain Richard Merrell departed from
Los Angeles as the pilot-in-command of Northwest Airlines
Flight 1024.1 As the non-flying pilot for this flight, Merrell's du-
ties included communicating with Air Traffic Control (ATC).S
While performing these duties, Merrell incorrectly acknowl-
I Garvey v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 190 F.3d 571, 576 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (dis-
cussing the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 44701 (2000)).
2 See 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a) (2000); see also 49 U.S.C. § 1133 (1999).
3 See 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d) (2000).
4 See Garvey, 190 F.3d at 576.
5 See id. (citing 49 U.S.C. §44709 (d) (3) (2000)); see also Hinson v. Nat'l Trans.
Safety Bd., 57 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (discussing the same provision).
6 See John S. Yodice, Questioning Clearances, A.O.P.A. PILOT, June 1999, at
<http://aopa.org/members/files/pilot/999/pc9906.html> (last visited Sept.
11, 2000).
7 See Garvey, 190 F.3d at 574.
8 See Valentine v. Merrell, NTSB Order No. EA-4530 at 2 (1997), revd sub nom.
Garvey v. Nat'l Trans. Safety Bd., 190 F.3d 571 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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edged (or "read back") a clearance intended for another flight.9
Because both Merrell and the intended flight crew simultane-
ously acknowledged the clearance, the stronger transmission
(from the intended flight crew) blocked out (or "stepped on")
Merrell's acknowledgment.1" The controller, therefore, neither
heard nor corrected Merrell."
Unaware of his error, Merrell's flight complied with the clear-
ance and started climbing to the altitude assigned to the other
airplane. 12 At that point, controllers observed the altitude devia-
tion and instructed Merrell to return immediately to his as-
signed altitude.13 Before he could comply, however, Merrell
had climbed 1,200 feet past his assigned altitude and the stan-
dard vertical separation of 1,000 feet between airplanes was
lost.14
On November 3, 1995, the FAA issued an enforcement order
against Merrell. 15 The FAA alleged that Merrell had violated
three separate Federal Aviation Regulations: two governing
compliance with air traffic control clearances, and one catch-all
regulation that prohibits the "careless or reckless operation" of
an aircraft. 16 Merrell appealed the action to NTSB Administra-
tive Law Judge (A.L.J.), William R. Mullins, who affirmed the
FAA order.' 7 Judge Mullins concluded that the controller's fail-
ure to hear Merrell's acknowledgment "did not absolve 'Captain
Merrell of his responsibility to hear that [the] initial clearance'
was for another aircraft.""8
9 Garvey, 190 F.3d at 574.
10 Id.; see also Valentine, NTSB Order No. EA-4530 at 2 (1997).
I Garvey, 190 F.3d at 574.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. According to Section 4-5-1 of FAA Publication 7110.65M (entitled Air
Traffic Control), air traffic controllers must provide a minimum of 1,000 feet of
vertical separation between aircraft operating under Instrument Flight Rules
(I.F.R.) below 29,000 feet. See Air Traffic Control, 7110.65M § 4-5-1 (Eff. Aug. 10,
2000) at <www.ama500.jccbi.gov/site/library/7110-65/m/chap4/chap4sec5.
pdf.> (last visited Dec. 1, 2000).
15 Garvey, 190 F.3d at 574.
16 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.123(a) (1995) (prohibiting deviations for clearances ab-
sent an amended clearance, the existence of an emergency, or in response to a
traffic collision hazard); 14 C.F.R. § 91.123(e) (1995) (prohibiting the operation
of an aircraft according to instructions issued to a pilot of another aircraft); 14
C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (1989) (prohibiting the operation of aircraft "in a careless or
reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another").
17 Garvey, 190 F.3d at 574-75. Because Merrell filed a timely report of the inci-
dent, the FAA waived sanctions against Merrell. Id. at 574.
18 Id.at 575.
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On appeal, the NTSB reversed. 19 According to the Board,
Merrell's mistake constituted only "an error of perception" and
the evidence did not support the conclusion that Merrell "was
performing his duties in a careless or otherwise unprofessional
manner."20 Therefore, Merrell's actions did not so greatly affect
"safety in air commerce or air transportation" to require affirma-
tion of the FAA order.2'
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed
the NTSB by relying on a footnote from Hinson v. National
Transportation Safety Board in which the court concluded that
Congress has "unambiguously direct[ed] the NTSB to defer to
the FAA's interpretations of its own regulations."22 Further, the
Hinson court analogized the Federal Aviation Act's split-en-
forcement regime to that of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act.23 Consequently, the court reasoned that the same defer-
ence due the Secretary of Labor was due to the Administrator of
the FAA.24 To overcome that deference, an airman must show
that the FAA's interpretation is "arbitrary, capricious, or other-
wise not according to law."25
According to the court of appeals, the Administrator's inter-
pretation in this case was not arbitrary or capricious.26 In light
of the "catastrophic consequences of noncompliance with ATC
transmissions," the FAA had interpreted its regulations harshly,
but justifiably, and "consistent [ly] with the regulation. '27 In es-
sence, the "unforgiving environment of aviation "28 necessitated
such an interpretation. The FAA was reasonable, therefore, to
ensure diligence by holding pilots to "an exacting standard of
accountability. 29
Although Judge Garland wrote for a unanimous panel, the
aviation community's reaction to Garvey has been almost uni-
19 Valentine, NTSB Order No. EA-4530 at 2.
20 Id. at 4. The Board also reaffirmed its holding upon a motion for reconsid-
eration. See Garvey v. Merrell, NTSB Order No. EA-4670 (1998).
21 Garvey, NTSB Order No. EA-4670. See 49 U.S.C. § 44709(f) (2000) (discuss-
ing judicial review).
22 Hinson, 57 F.3d at 1148, n.2 (stating that 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d) (3) and not
case law governs whether the "NTSB owes deference to the FAA.")
23 See id. (citing Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 147, 150-57 (1991)).
24 See Garvey, 190 F.3d at 577-78.
25 See id. at 580 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d) (3) (2000)).
26 Id. at 581.
27 Id. at 580-81.
28 Id. at 581.
29 Id.
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formly critical. For example, the Air Line Pilots Association
(A.L.P.A.) concluded that its members "[came] out the losers in
the FAA's successful legal appeal. '3 0 Furthermore, the Aircraft
Owners and Pilots Association (A.O.P.A.) criticized the decision
by reminding the court that § 44709 of the Federal Aviation Act
also allows the NTSB to reverse an FAA order if the Board finds
that "safety in air commerce or air transportation ... do[es] not
require affirmation of the order."3 " A.O.P.A. also claimed that
Garvey "frustrates the intent of Congress that a pilot have a fed-
eral agency independent of the FAA to review FAA enforcement
actions. 3
2
In its decision, the court correctly applied a portion of the
governing law, but ignored another relevant section. On one
hand, the court correctly looked to Auer v. Robbins33 to deter-
mine whether the NTSB should have deferred to the FAA's in-
terpretation of 14 C.F.R. § 91.123(a) and (e). 4 In Auer, the
Supreme Court held that an appellate tribunal must defer to an
agency's interpretation that is not "plainly erroneous or incon-
sistent with the regulation."3 5 Looking beyond Auer, too, the ap-
pellate court also correctly found that "the NTSB need not
follow [the interpretation] if it is 'arbitrary, capricious, or other-
wise not according to law.' "36 On the other hand, however, the
court disregarded the statutory provision that allows the NTSB
to overturn an FAA order if the interest of safety does not war-
rant affirmation. 7 Such misguided interpretation of applicable
law produces two results: the Garvey court fails to promote avia-
tion safety as fully as it should, while simultaneously an airman's
ability to obtain fair appellate review is eroded by needlessly
binding the NTSB.
Regulatory interpretations that undermine aviation safety sub-
vert the goal of "safety in air commerce 31 8 as well as rise to the
30 Jan Steebnik, ALPA, NFSB Lose Appeal on 'Interpretive Rule', Pilots Hit with Full
Responsibility to Adhere to Clearances, AIR LINE PILOT MAGAZINE, November 1999 at
http://safety.alpha.org.library/alp.novinterpretrule.htm (last visited Dec. 1,
2000).
31 Yodice, supra note 6; see also 49 U.S.C. § 44709 (d) (1) (A) (2000).
32 See Yodice, supra note 6.
33 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
-4 See Garvey, 190 F.3d at 580.
35 See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
36 See Garvey, 190 F.3d at 580.
37 See 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(1) (A) (2000).
38 Id.
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level of "arbitrary or capricious"3 9 and therefore need not be
affirmed. While the court correctly surmised that "catastrophic
consequences 40 might result from a pilot's failure to adhere to
a clearance or instruction, the court erred by placing full re-
sponsibility on flight crews to ensure that clearances are cor-
rectly followed.4 ' The court erroneously accepted the
Administrator's view that the only means to ensure that "pilots
exercise unflagging diligence in monitoring, understanding,
and obeying clearly transmitted ATC instructions" is to "hold pi-
lots to 'an exacting standard of accountability.' "412 Because the
pilot and the controller operate as a team, both should bear the
responsibility to ensure that clearances are understood and exe-
cuted promptly and correctly.
In the Airman's Information Manual (AIM), 43 the FAA ac-
knowledges the mutually dependent role of controllers and pi-
lots. According to the AIM:
pilots should read back those parts of ATC clearances and instruc-
tions containing altitude assignments or vectors as a means of
mutual verification. The readback of the "numbers" serves as a
double check between pilots and controllers and reduces the kinds of
communications errors that occur when a number is either
"misheard" or is incorrect.4"
39 See id. § 44709(d)(3).
40 Garvey, 190 F.3d at 582.
41 See Yodice, supra note 6.
42 See Garvey, 190 F.3d at 581.
43 Aeronautical Information Manual, Official Guide to Basic Flight Information
and ATC Procedures, at <http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/AIM/index.htm.> (last vis-
ited Dec. 1, 2000) [hereinafter AIM]. Although not regulatory, the FAA pub-
lishes the AIM to provide pilots with the proper procedures for flying in today's
airspace. To that end, the FAA often relies upon the AIM in Advisory Circulars
(AC) published for flight crews. In AC 90-66a, for example, the FAA amended a
previous AC to reflect modern procedures, including amending the appendix to
"remain consistent with the Airman's Information Manual (AIM)." Advisoy Cir-
cular 90-66a, Recommended Standard Traffic Patterns and Practices for Aeronautical Op-
erations and Airports without Operating Control Towers, August 26, 1993 at <http:www.
faa.gov/avr/afs/acs/90-66a.txt> (last visited Nov. 30, 2000). For that reason,
flight crew reliance upon the procedures in the AIM should be encouraged, not
disregarded.
44 See AIM, supra note 43, Pilot Responsibility Upon Clearance Issuance, at § 4-4-
6(b) (second and third emphasis added); see also Pilot Responsibility for Compli-
ance with Air Traffic Control Clearances and Instructions, 64 Fed. Reg. 62 (April
1, 1999) (discussing the "shared responsibilities" of pilots and controllers in inter-
preting and complying with air traffic control clearances) [hereinafter Pilot
Responsibility].
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Furthermore, the FAA itself declared that the "FAA has long
considered that aviation requires air traffic control to function
as a cooperative system, in which all participants must share the
responsibility for accurate communication."45 The FAA wants the
best of both worlds: a cooperative system of communication be-
tween pilots and controllers, but full responsibility for compli-
ance (and ultimately safety) only with the pilots. The
Administrator's interpretation thereby provides an incentive to
only one team member to ensure compliance with A.T.C. in-
structions. Not only is this interpretation inconsistent with in-
formation published by the FAA, but it ultimately undermines
aviation safety. A team is only as strong as its weakest player, and
the Garvey court allowed self-imposed deterioration. For that
reason, the Garvey interpretation is incompatible with the goal
of every aviation regulation: the safe and efficient use of our
airspace.
Second, the Garvey decision also erodes the ability of airmen
to obtain fair appellate review of enforcement actions. The
court's regulatory interpretation therefore is contrary to law and
should be overturned. By providing airmen with the ability to
appeal enforcement orders to a neutral third party, Congress
clearly intended to provide impartial review of FAA enforce-
ment proceedings. 46 And while admitting that deference "does
not mean blind obedience, ' 47 the Garvey court failed to recog-
nize that it has undermined Congress's intent by providing yet
another advantage to the Administrator in prosecuting airmen.
Unsurprisingly, a grateful FAA already has capitalized on its ad-
vantage by issuing a regulatory interpretation that likely will
force the NTSB to comply with the Garvey interpretation.
On March 26, 1999, the FAA issued an "interpretive rule" re-
futing the NTSB's reasoning in Garvey and its predecessors.4"
Paralleling the Garvey court's logic, the rule states that
"[c]ontrary to the NTSB's reasoning, pilots do not meet [the]
regulatory imperative [of 14 C.F.R. § 91.123] by offering a full
and complete readback or by taking other action that would
tend to expose their error and allow for it to be corrected."49
Accordingly, "the simple act of giving a readback does not shift
full responsibility to air traffic control and cannot insulate pilots
45 See Pilot Responsibility, supra note 44 (emphasis added).
46 See 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d) (2000).
47 See Garvey, 190 F.3d at 580.




from their primary responsibility under 14 C.F.R. § 91.123 . . . to
listen attentively, to hear accurately, and to construe reasonably
in the first instance. '50 Because this ruling has been officially
published in the Federal Register and the Garvey court sanc-
tioned its use, the NTSB must now defer to the ruling and may
be precluded from advancing any other interpretation of 14
C.F.R. § 91.123.51 As a practical matter, therefore, Garvey eased
the FAA's task in further pre-determining the outcome of appel-
late review of airman enforcement actions.
Promoting safety undoubtedly underlies all aviation regula-
tions. It is incumbent on all who work and play in aviation to
abide by these regulations so that all may safely use the nation's
airspace. Flight crews are merely one player in this team effort.
Placing liability for noncompliance solely on one player greatly
undermines the ability of the entire team to reach its goals. Un-
fortunately, by misconstruing 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d) and its def-
erence requirements, the Garvey court provided the initial step
toward this end.
Evan Singer*
50 Id. (emphasis added).
51 See 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d) (3) (2000) (requiring "written policy guidance avail-
able to the public related to sanctions to be imposed under this section"); see also
Smith v. N.T.S.B., 981 F.2d 1326, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (overturning an NTSB
order because "the FAA sanctions policy upon which it was based was not availa-
ble to the public at the time of the conduct."); Yodice, supra note 6 ("The official
publication of this interpretation, coupled with this law, now enables the FAA to
argue that the Board is powerless to make similar decisions in future cases.")
* B.A. Vanderbilt Universxity, 1998; Candidate for J.D., S.M.U. 2002; the
author also holds a commercial pilot certificate with multi-engine and instrument
ratings.
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